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A NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE
OF MACH’S PSYCHOLOGY
IN THE SENSORY ORDERGiandomenica BecchioABSTRACT
Purpose – The aim of this note is to explain what Hayek meant when in
The Sensory Order he claimed that Mach was one of his fundamental
readings in psychology while he was writing The Sensory Order.
Methodology/approach – A historical approach to show the different
role Mach played in Hayek and Neurath/Carnap.
Findings
 A parallelism between Mach–Kant and Hayek–Mach in psychology.
 Hayek’s rejection of Mach’s final philosophical approach as well as
his aversion against the Vienna Circle’s positivism as forms of
metaphysics, based on an awkward definition of isomorphism.
Research limitations/implications
 The human sciences cannot be reduced to the natural sciences.
 Any form of knowledge is knowledge of ‘‘how’’ rather than of
‘‘what’’.Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology
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GIANDOMENICA BECCHIO172Originality/value of the paper
 To show Mach’s role in Hayek’s psychology.
 To consider The Sensory Order as a relevant part of Hayek’s struggle
against reductionism in psychology.
Keywords: Kant; Mach; Neurath; Carnap; positivism.
INTRODUCTION
In the Preface of The Sensory Order, Hayek stated that this book was based
on his readings in psychology during 1919–1920, when he was still a young
student in Vienna interested in both psychology and economics. Among
many others, Hayek explicitly cited Mach’s influence on him. Hayek’s
contacts with the lively Viennese milieu during the 1920s and 1930s had a
fundamental role in the story of the use of Mach in Hayek’s book.
AsHayek himself explained,Mach had a great influence onViennese students
and scholars until the 1930s, because he represented ‘‘the only source of
arguments against a metaphysical and nebulous attitude’’ that was spreading
among scientists (Blackmore, Itagaki, & Tanaka, 2001, p. 124). The use of
Mach’s philosophy as a tool against any metaphysical attitude was particularly
strong inside the Vienna Circle, where scholars like Otto Neurath and Rudolph
Carnap had founded the Ernst Mach Society (Verein Ernst Mach, 1927) to
support their movement and to link Mach’s empiricism to their philosophical
approach,which they later named ‘‘logical positivism’’ (Blumberg&Feigl, 1931).
Hayek strongly criticized the Vienna Circle’s philosophical approach: he
mainly rejected Neurath’s physicalism (the belief that all science ultimately
reduces to the laws of physics, Neurath, 1931; Caldwell, 2004), even if he
showed some interest in Carnap’s logical system (Carnap, 1928). When
Hayek introduced the system of multiple classification in The Sensory Order,
he cited Carnap as the one who provided ‘‘a somewhat similar statement of
the problems of the order of sensory qualities’’ (Hayek, 1952, p. 51).
Nevertheless, in the mid-1930s, when Carnap officially subscribed to
Neurath’s physicalism, it culminated in the project of the unification of
science (Stadler, 2001).1 Hayek’s aversion arose:
From the fact that we shall never be able to achieve more than an ‘explanation of the
principle’ by which the order of mental events is determined, it also follows that we shall
never achieve a complete ‘unification’ of all sciences in the sense that all phenomena of
which it treats can be described in physical term. (Hayek, 1952, p. 191)
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Neurath:
their physical language, since it refers to the phenomenal or sensory qualities of the
objects, is not ‘‘physical’’ at all. Their use of this term rather implies a metaphysical belief
in the ‘‘ultimate reality’’ and constancy of the phenomenal world for which there is little
justification. (ibid.)
In this passage Hayek accused them of having dropped their original anti-
metaphysical attitude – mediated through Mach – to propose a new form a
metaphysical belief, based on the reduction of any reality to the empirical
realm.
Hayek’s j’accuse is significant: for 30 years the philosophers of the Vienna
Circle claimed Mach’s philosophy as one of the main sources of their
aversion to metaphysics and a pillar of their philosophical approach based
on a new form of positivism.2 In the International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science, Joergensen explained the three common traits between ‘‘Mach’s
positivism’’ and the Vienna Circle philosophy: the idea that ‘‘human
knowledge is a biological phenomenon’’; the rejection of any form of
‘‘thing-in-itself’’ (and for that matter, of any form of Kantianism) and the
overlap between physical reality and physical elements (Joergensen, 1951,
p. 853).
To explain the link between Mach and Hayek on the one hand and
Hayek’s aversion to the logical positivism (apparently and ‘‘officially’’
rooted in Mach’s philosophy) on the other hand, we need to consider what
Hayek meant when he mentioned Mach’s influence in The Sensory Order.HAYEK’S INTERPRETATION OF MACH’S
PSYCHOLOGY
Mach discovered an interest in psychology after having read a copy of
Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that belonged to his father.
He wrote:
The book made at the time a powerful and ineffaceable impression upon me, the like of
which I never afterwards experienced in any of my philosophical reading. Some two or
three years later the superfluity of the role played by ‘‘the thing in itself’’ abruptly
dawned upon me. On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego
suddenly appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly
coherent in the ego. Although the actual working out of this thought did not occur until
a later period, yet this moment was decisive for my whole view. (Blackmore, 1972, p. 30)
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impossibility), but according to the way human minds represent it through
mental categories. Mach did not share Kant’s conception of space and time
in his Transcendental Aesthetics, but he was impressed by the way in which
Kant described mental representations in his Transcendental Analytics. As it
is well known, once Kant defined the process of knowledge of phenomena,
as they ‘‘appear’’ to the human mind, he introduced the concept of Ding an
sich to define not how to ‘‘know’’ things, but how to ‘‘think’’ them.
In The Sensory Order, Hayek rememberedMach’s rejection of the Kantian
idea of an a priori (the so-called noumenon or Ding an sich or thing-in-itself).
We can say that Hayek shared the same experience as Mach: he wrote: ‘‘in an
experience very similar to what which Mach himself describes with reference
to Kant’s concept of the Ding an sichy ’’ (Hayek, 1952, p. vi), he was
influenced by Mach, but he rejected Mach’s later approach. The influence of
Mach’s psychology on Hayek goes beyond the parallelism between Kant–
Mach and Mach–Hayek, though. Hayek carefully read Mach’s two books:
Analysis of Sensations (1897) and Knowledge and Error (1905).
In the former work, Mach considered sensations as interactions between
experience and pre-formed cognitive structures; these structures are able to
classify the relationship among elements that form the experienced
sensations (for instance a melody is not recognized when we capture its
single sounds, but when we capture the relationship among them). This
process is the starting point of all our perceptions that form human
experience. Hence, experience requires an a priori in a way that recalls
Kant’s Transcendental Analytics. Contrary to Kant’s philosophy however,
Mach’s a priori structure of any experience is itself formed by experience:
human cognitive structure is itself formed through previous experience, as
well as human experience is structured by it.
In Knowledge and Error, Mach explained the conceptualization process
that goes beyond sensations. He rejected the idea of a spiritual capacity
inherent to the organism to order sensations (in a Kantian way) and
introduced what he called ‘‘higher-order thought patterns’’ (representations,
feelings, affects, and moods) as a ‘‘summary of a recognizable ‘way of
acting,’’’ based on ‘‘acquired patterns of response aiding adaptation and
survival’’ (Arens, 1985, p. 155).
Mach claimed that things, corps, and material objects are nothing but
connections among their elements, colors, sounds, and so on: human minds are
able to use the sensory order to classify and to know objects; including even
space and time. Mach’s description of natural phenomena through a mental
system of classification – in a framework of relational functions rather than
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a sort of metaphysical residual (reformulated in a different way).
According to Mach, there’s no difference between the objects of physics
and the objects of psychology, just their orientation of research is different:
a color can be regarded as an object of physics if it is related with the source
of its light, but it can also be regarded as an object of psychology if it is
related with its dependence on the retina. Mach clearly stated that
sensations are not generated by corps, but corps are generated by the
complexity of sensations and corps are mental symbols for those complex-
ities of sensations. There is a complete parallelism between physical order
and sensory order. Biology can bridge the gap between physics and
psychology as well as explain the complexities of the direct connections
among phenomena.
Hence, Mach’s final approach in psychology was the isomorphism of
physical and psychological realms to explain any kind of phenomenon in a
scientific way with no room for any form of metaphysical residual.3 The
Vienna Circle mediated it from Mach. Hayek did not accept Mach’s final
development of his psychology and rejected the Vienna Circle’s physicalism:
he ‘‘paradoxically’’ considered both as a new form of metaphysics, precisely
based on that isomorphism.HAYEK ON ISOMORPHISM
Isomorphism is a crucial point in Hayek’s psychology. In The Sensory Order
he claimed that there are physical objects (¼ realm of nature and physics)
and phenomenological objects (¼ realm of mind and psychology):
psychology must start from stimuli defined in physical terms and proceed to show why
and how the senses classify similar physical stimuli sometimes as alike and sometimes as
different, and why different physical stimuli will sometimes appear as similar and
sometimes as different. (Hayek, 1952, pp. 7–8)
The sensory qualities are known through subjective experience, and they
form a self-contained system that enables the human mind to describe them
only in terms of its relations to other qualities. If we try to give an
explanation
we are not to move in a circle but are to succeed in explaining the relation of this system
of qualities to the world of physics, the object of our explanation must be the whole
complex relations which determine the order of the system of sensory (or rather of
mental) qualities. (Hayek, 1952, p.37)
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The only way in which we can break the circle in which we movey and hope to arrive at
an explanation of the processesy is to construct a system of physical elements which is
‘‘topographically equivalent’’ or ‘‘isomorphous’’ with the system of sensory qualities.
(ibid.)
Hayek was very careful to give a precise meaning of this isomorphism. He
specified that it is ‘‘somewhat similar’’ to the use made by the Gestalt
School, but without any form of ambiguity that was still present in their
approach. Isomorphism is meant by Hayek in
its strict mathematical meaning of a structural correspondence between systems of
related elements in which the relations connecting these elements possess the same
formal properties. (Hayek, 1952, p. 38)
Contrary to the Gestalt School’s approach, Hayek claimed that
isomorphism describes only a similarity of structures as whole and of the
position of corresponding elements within the structure, but says nothing
about any other properties of the corresponding elements apart from their
position in the structure. Isomorphism for Hayek is not a way to ban
immaterial structures: the individual elements of the structure
are totally irrelevant for the question of whether the two structures are isomorphous; and
isomorphism may not only exist between structures made of different materials but even
between material and immaterial structures so long as there exist any common formal
attributes of the relations which connect the elements. (Hayek, 1952, p. 39)
Hayek goes onto explain that the physical order of the external world is
known by the mental or phenomenal order of sensations even if this
knowledge is largely only a ‘‘knowing how’’ rather than ‘‘knowing what’’
and ‘‘the physical order differs from the phenomenal order’’ (ibid.).
In the last chapter of The Sensory Order Hayek specifies that:
although the theory developed here was suggested in the first instance by the
psychological views which Ernst Mach has outlined in his Analysis of Sensations and
elsewhere, its systematic development leads to a refutation of his and similar
phenomenalist philosophies: by destroying the conception of elementary and constant
sensations as ultimate constituents of the world, it restores the necessity of a belief in an
objective physical world which is different from that presented to us by our sense.
(Hayek, 1952, pp. 175–176)
This is the great difference between Hayek’s theory of mind and Mach’s
final development in psychology that led him to a phenomenalist philosophy
(accepted by the Vienna Circle). Hayek considered Mach’s final step as a
form of reductionism he never accepted in psychology or economics.
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As Hayek himself stated in the Preface of The Sensory Order, psychology is
essentially ‘‘dealing with the problems of the methods of the social
sciencesy [a] concern with the logical character of social theory’’ (Hayek,
1952, p. v). From a broader perspective, Hayek’s aversion to reductionism
can be seen as the reverse side of the struggle for individualism he started in
the late 1930s with the publication of ‘‘Economics and Knowledge’’ and
culminated in Individualism and Economic Order (1949), which was
published just few years before his decision to revise and finally publish
The Sensory Order. During the early 1950s while working on The Sensory
Order, Hayek composed ‘‘Within Systems and About Systems,’’ which dealt
with the possible knowledge of our mental processes and with the
relationship between knowledge and the external environment.4
In the early 1930s, Hayek edited Carl Menger’s Collected Works
(in German): he also wrote a well-known presentation of Menger’s thought
and work. It was published in Economica, and it represented the
introduction of Menger to the English-speaking world (Hayek, 1934). In
this essay, Hayek stressed the centrality of individualism in Menger’s
approach when he had described how markets work and how economic
agents behave when they make an economic decision. In the same period
Hayek started to work on the link between economic choice and individual
knowledge, which culminated in his well-known paper Economics and
Knowledge.5
From Economics and Knowledge onward, Hayek introduced psychology
into economics to explain the dynamics of a society in an individualistic
perspective. In this view, Hayek’s decision to work back on revise and
publish The Sensory Order can be regarded as the final step of his research
project on the nature of individual choice.
After having described the role of knowledge in individual plans and the
following mechanism of the market, as well as the use of knowledge in a
competition as a discovery process, Hayek described the nature of human
mind. The Sensory Order can be seen as Hayek’s tool to show how people
know the internal and external reality, how they form their knowledge and
how they can share it to make their own plans and coordinate them.
From Hayek’s presentation of Menger’s thought as a stronghold of
individualism (1934) to the publication of The Sensory Order (1952),
Hayek’s work can be regarded as a tentative to investigate how society
works from an individualistic point of view and how the human mind knows
from an antireductionist perspective; in opposition to a new kind of holistic
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the Vienna Circle, mainly by Neurath and Carnap.
The role of Mach in this story is important. Both Hayek and Neurath/
Carnap considered Mach the most influential anti-metaphysical thinker.
Nevertheless, Neurath/Carnap accepted Mach’s reductionism in psychology
as well as his final philosophical approach as a direct development of his
psychology. Furthermore, the unity between physics and psychology
(between physical and sensorial orders) in Mach’s thought also opened the
way to the Vienna Circle’s ideal of a unified science (from physics to social
sciences), never accepted by Hayek.
Mach’s influence on Hayek is more complex, though.
Hayek started from Mach’s psychological inquiry, which was influenced
by Kant’s research on the nature of knowledge; but, as Mach had refused
the final stage of Kantism (the Dich an sich as a metaphysical residuals),
Hayek refused the final stage of Machian philosophy (the isomorphism
between physical and mental realm as a form of reductionism). Hayek
refused Mach’s destruction of ‘‘the conception of elementary and constant
sensations as ultimate constituents of the world’’ and he restored ‘‘the
necessity of a belief in an objective physical world which is different from
that presented to us by our senses’’ (Hayek, 1952, p. 176, 8.37). In a certain
sense, Hayek went back to a sort of Kantian dualism, without introducing a
negative concept, like Ding an sich. Hayek wrote:
The conclusion towhich our theory leads is thus that to us not onlymind as a whole but also
all individual mental processes must forever remain phenomena of a special kind, which.
Although produced by the same principles which we know to operate in the physical world,
we shall never be able fully to explain in terms of physical laws. (Hayek, 1952, p. 191)
It will derive its statements about some mental processes from its knowledge about other
mental process, but it will never be able to bridge the gap between the realm of the mental
and the realm of the physical. Such a verstehende psychology, which starts from our given
knowledge of mental processes, will, however, never be able to explain why we must think
thus and not otherwise, why we arrive at particular conclusions. (Hayek, 1952, p. 192)CONCLUSION
The Sensory Order can be regarded as a part of Hayek’s methodological
struggle for the individualism and antireductionism he applied to economics
and psychology: if the individual mental mechanisms of choice can be
explained, it would be possible to show how the market works. The
reference to Mach in The Sensory Order can be regarded as a part of the
A Note on the Influence of Mach’s Psychology in The Sensory Order 179struggle that involved the rejection of any form of new or old positivism and
led him back to psychology in the early 1950s.NOTES
1. The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science was published from 1938 to
1969 by the University of Chicago Press and edited by Neurath, Carnap, and Morris
(Morris, 1960).
2. For an historical outline of Mach’s influence on the Vienna Circle and later in
the US after the migration of many Viennese philosophers, see Blackmore, 1972.
3. Carnap introduced isomorphism in dealing with structural relations in logics
(Friedman, 2007).
4. Hayek never finished the paper, but he chose to break it into some parts, one of
these was ‘‘Degrees of explanations,’’ he published in 1955 (Caldwell, 2000), that is
considered as the starting point for Hayek’s research on complex systems and on his
idea that complex phenomena are founded on mental patterns, and their degree of
complexity in mental and social phenomena is so high that it was necessary to find a
tool to describe how they work.
5. This paper was the beginning of what has been called ‘‘Hayek’s transforma-
tion’’ (Caldwell, 1988).REFERENCES
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